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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the political, economic, and social
relationships between China and Japan following the formal normalization of
these relations in 1972 and subsequent decay during the past decade. Current
issues such as Japan's foiled U.N. Security Council bid, underwater drilling rights,
Taiwan, and growing nationalism within both countries are discussed. The
primary findings in this paper argue that Sino-Japanese relations are in a
precarious state and can be repaired only if Japan issues an all-encompassing
formal reparation for the actions of its imperial army on its Asian neighbors during
the 1930s and 1940s. After this last obstacle has been eradicated, China will
finally fully embrace the possibility of an enhanced and mutually beneficial SinoJapanese relationship.
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Sino-Japanese Relations since the 1972 Normalization:
Prospects for Conflict Resolution and Regional Hegemony

In the past decade, the diplomatic relationship between China and Japan has
been increasingly agitated by controversies initiated by both sides in an indirect
race for regional hegemony in Asia. While major conflict has been avoided so far,
if both nations continue to neglect the causes of these issues of dispute, the region
could find itself in dire straights in the coming decades. While at times they
cooperate and a shared occupancy of the seat of power on the Asian stage seems
plausible, as was especially true in the 1970s and 1980s, the relationship between
the two nations has recently become more fragile due to conflicts ranging from the
future of Taiwan to emerging strong nationalistic sentiments in both countries.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the historical, economical, and political
events and issues that have affected Sino-Japanese relations since the
normalization of relations in 1972, and to analyze these effects on current and
future interaction.
Historical Background of Normalization
In 1931 the Japanese occupied Manchuria, the first of their many conquests
in Asia. By 1937, the Japanese imperial army had overpowered much of China
including Chahar, Hopeh, Peking, Shanghai, and Nanking. Most infamous of
these invasions was the capture of Nanking. After seizure of the city in December
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1937, the Japanese army began a massacre of the population which included
civilian men, women, and children. Estimates of the death toll range from
250,000 to 350,000 persons (Chang, 1997). This number far exceeds the
casualties sustained in both Nagasaki and Hiroshima combined. In addition to
execution, there was widespread torture and rape of the Chinese civilians during
the weeks of the massacre.

During Japan's 15-year military occupation of

various Asian countries, an estimated 10-30 million people including POWs and
forced laborers, died of a myriad of causes ranging from execution to starvation
(Chang, 1997).
Another major atrocity by Japan against its Asian neighbors involves the
imperial military's use of sex slaves, commonly referred to as comfort women,
during the occupation. Approximately 200,000 women from countries such as
China, Philippines, Malaysia, and Korea, were manipulated or kidnapped by the
Japanese and forcibly raped countless times (Brook, 2001). After the Japanese
surrender during WWII, many of these women were killed or abandoned and
subsequently died of starvation. The experiences of the surviving women were
almost entirely overlooked by historians until the 1990s when some women began
to come forward with their stories (Brook, 2001). In the years following WWII,
relations between Japan and China were almost nonexistent.
In the early 1970s, several developed nations began endeavors to establish
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in Beijing. On February
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21, 1972 US President Richard Nixon embarked on his weeklong "ice-breaking"
visit to the PRC ("Backgrounder," 2002). Japan quickly followed suit that same
year by sending Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei to China to discuss terms of
normalization with Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-Lai (Kawashima, 2003). The
fruits of this historic meeting were manifested in the September 29 signing of the
1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Statement which officially normalized Sino-Japanese
relations (Kim, 1975). The statement also made provisions for the eventual
signing of an official peace treaty between China and Japan (Kawashima, 2003).
At this time, Japan "expressed regret for the sufferings inflicted on China
before 1945" (Beasley, 2000, p. 241).

China, in tum, relinquished "any claim to

a war indemnity" (Beasley, 2000, p. 242). China's conditions for the SinoJapanese reconciliation also called for the "recognition of the People's Republic as
the sole legal government of China, acceptance of Taiwan as an inalienable part of
the territory of the People's Republic, and abrogation of Japan's peace treaty with
the Nationalists" (Hsiao, 1974, p. 721). As a result, any formal recognition or
contract by Japan in regard to Taiwan as an entity separate from China was
deemed null.
Following the formal normalization of relations, the remainder of SinoJapanese relations throughout the 1970s was focused on cultivating trade between
the two nations as well as developing bilateral administrative arrangements which
dealt with a variety of issues such as civil aviation and fisheries (Kim, 1975). In
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August of 1978, after years of negotiations and the death of Mao Tse-tung, an
official peace treaty, the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, was
approved. Most of the negotiations concerning the treaty dealt with China's
insistence on including an anti-hegemony clause. Japan was wary of such
inclusion because of the implications it would have on relations with Moscow,
who would no doubt interpret it as being directed toward the Soviet Union.
However a compromise was made after both parties agreed on a diluted version of
the anti-hegemony clause (Kim, 1975).
This treaty and similar agreements between the two countries made at this
time were ambitious in their provisions for a strong and prosperous China/Japan
relationship.

For example, a six-year trade agreement signed in February of 1978

made provisions for impressive exchanges of Chinese oil and Japanese machinery.
However, China eventually failed to meet the lofty petroleum quotas (Wang,
1993). This pattern of initial high-ceiling expectations and later disappointment
can be transposed from the trade sector to diplomatic bilateral relations on the
whole from the honeymoon of normalization in the 1970s and 1980s and
subsequent breakdown during the 1990s.
Nature of Relationship during the 1980s
The 1980s were marked by amplification of bilateral contact between the
two nations.

Although not at the astronomical rate initially predicted in the

1970s, trade boomed. While bilateral trade was just over a billion dollars in the
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early 1970s, in 1981 it had reached almost ten billion (Wang, 1993). By the early
1980s, Japan was China's largest source of credit, contributing almost fifteen
billion US dollars. Trade during this time also became diversified from the initial
patterns of Chinese raw energy for Japanese machinery (Wang 1993).
Fluctuating Public Opinion within China and Japan
Many people, although not blind to the past, were optimistic about the
future of the increasingly interconnected nations. They viewed the formal
normalization of 1972 as the first step of a close relationship between the Asian
nations. Some scholars even proposed the formation of a bond like the one shared
by Germany and France. Various public opinion polls in both countries illustrate
the attitudes of the masses in the two nations. While in 1980, 79% of Japanese
polled harbored friendly feelings toward China, after the June 1989 Tiananmen
Square catastrophe during which student protestors were violently suppressed
under orders from the Chinese government, 40% of Japanese responded that they
now looked upon their Asian neighbor in an unfriendly manner (Kawashima,
2003).
Trends in Relations during the 1990s
Public opinion continued a downward spiral throughout the 1990s. The
highpoint of relations during this period probably came during Emperor Akihito's
1992 visit to China. Events such as the renegotiation of Japan's US security
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alliance and China's ambitious forays into Japanese territory fed the fires of
resentment between the two nations.
Although diplomatic relations between the nations often seemed to be
strained during the 1990s, trade relations continued to skyrocket, becoming five
times larger during the decade (Kawashima, 2003).
China's Growing Economy and Status (1970-Present)
When evaluating the fluctuating relationship between China and Japan
since normalization, it is vital that one examine the extreme economic, political,
and ideological changes experienced by the two nations over the past three
decades. China's incredible economic explosion is incredibly significant and
merits consideration in any discussion of Sino-Japanese relations.
From 1979 until 2003, China's economy experienced an average annual
growth rate of 8-9% (Wang, 2005). Their foreign trade has surged past the one
trillion dollar mark; their biggest trading partners being Japan and the United
States. Foreign direct investment (FDI) also boomed; between 1985-90 it
increased an average of30 per cent annually ("The Chinese Economy," 1992).
Comparisons can even be drawn between "the pattern of consumption in China
during 1985-1990 with that of Japan in 1955-1960"("The Chinese Economy,"
1992. p. 498). During the mid-1990s, growth slowed slightly as the Chinese
government sought to take preventative measures against inflation ("The Chinese
Economy," 1992). Although China did experience remarkable achievements
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during the past two decades, that progress was not wrought without sacrifices.
Critics suggest that economic and social security, income equality and the quality
of the environment have all been casualties of post-1978 reforms Chinese
economic development as a whole exploded during the 1980s and 1990s, however
it should be noted that it was irregular and sporadic, and has left scars on the
modem day PRC ("The Chinese Economy," 1992).
Nationalistic Trends in Asia during Past Decade
Within the past decade, recent trends, most notably towards nationalism,
have been sweeping Asia. The motivation behind this move towards the
unification of the population is often a direct result of opposition to a neighboring
country. For example, large groups of Chinese have drawn together and
trumpeted their national identity when they found a common transgressor in the
form of a Japanese action or event. The April 2005 protests and vandalizing of
Japanese-owned property attest to that phenomenon (Jennings, 2005).
The decline of the Soviet Union left a conspicuous void in Asia; one that
both Japan and China seem intent on filling. While some naively speculated that
the two powers would cooperate and jointly become the major leaders of the
region, in reality they have been butting heads, both trying to out-muscle the other
in a quest for control.
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Recent Growth of Nationalism within China
As China continues to blossom, the motivating ideology of its people and
government is continuously adapting itself. China's middle class is emerging and
defining itself while the participation by capitalists in the government is changing
the philosophy of the nation. Nationalism has increasingly replaced communism; a
trend which is being nervously monitored by the administration in Beijing ("Wen
Seeking," 2002). This new nationalism is evident in the bolder foreign policy of
China that has been surfacing over the past decade (Wang, 2005). Many cite
former Chinese President Jiang Zemin's pursuit of a "patriotic education" for
China that more or less translated as anti-Japanese sentiments ("Wen Seeking,"
2002). Critics accuse China of nurturing anti-Japanese sentiment to stifle and
prevent anti-government protests. Nationalism has been recently boosted even
more by China's successful 2008 Olympic bid. As previously mentioned,
nationalistic sentiment was also visible during the protests against Japan in April
(Jennings, 2005).
Trends Toward Nationalism in Japan
These new nationalistic sentiments are not unique to China. Japan too, in
the past decade has experienced a revival of nationalism. Chief Asia
correspondent for London's Financial Times, Victor Mallet, observes:
The newly assertive mood - expressed in films and manga comic books as
well as in a directive from the Tokyo Board of Education requiring teachers
to stand in front of the Rising Sun flag at school ceremonies and sing the
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imperial national anthem - has worsened Japan's relations with the rest of
Asia. (p. 17)
Fueling the fire, Koizumi made yet another visit to the controversial
Yasukuni shrine in October 2005. Since Koizumi announced that he has no
intentions of seeking another term as prime minister after his expires in September
2006, there has been much speculation over who will succeed him. Shinzo Abe,
currently cited as the most popular potential candidate, is staunchly nationalistic,
as is Taro Aso, another likely candidate ("Koizumi's Last," 2005). The popularity
of these candidates among the Japanese is a testament to the general public's
support and attitudes concerning a revival in nationalism for Japan.
State of Present Sino-Japanese Relations
Several recent events seem aimed to move Japan from a constitutionallypacifist nation to what Prime Minister Koizumi calls a "normal country," capable
of a more "international role for Tokyo and the revision ofthe pacifist
Constitution to acknowledge the country's considerable armed forces" (Sieff,
2005). Many Japanese leaders' latest stances and actions concerning issues
including Japan's Self Defense Forces, the Taiwan issue, ODA reform, and
controversies dealing with Japan's wartime past have triggered intense reactions
from China and other Asian neighbors.
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Remilitarization of Japan
In late October 2005, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee

made up of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld, Japanese Defense Agency Director General Yoshinori Ono, and
Japanese Foreign Minitster Nobutaka Machimura, announced an agreement which
will increase the cooperation between U.S. forces and Japanese Self Defense
Forces. Ono called this arrangement a "historic process" and declared that the
"Japanese government was ready to expand the Japanese Self Defense Forces' role
to engage in joint defense activities with U. S. forces" (Sieff, 2005). An example
of the possibilities of such joint defense projects would be using Japanesegenerated radar information to discharge interceptor missiles from U.S. destroyers.
"Concrete implementation schedules" for the joint activities will completed by
March 2006 (Sieff, 2005).
These developments, which increase the participation of the Japanese in
missile defense systems in Asia, continue the trend of raising eyebrows in regard
to the Japanese Constitution, in particular Article 9. Also referred to as the peace
clause, Article 9 prohibits Japan from participating in "collective self-defense"
(Alford, 2005). Additionally, the U.S. and Japan also reached an agreement
reducing the number of U.S. marines stationed in Japan from 14,500 to 7,500 over
the course of six years. Much ofthe personnel will be relocated to the U.S.
territory of Guam (Alford, 2005).
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Japan is pursuing development of its own ballistic military defense (BMD)
system. Aware of China's apprehension of such capabilities, Japanese officials
generally favor the term BMD over theater missile defense (TMD) systems which
carry a connotation of regional use as opposed to strictly defense. In regard to
Chinese criticism, Japan is also quick to clarify that any BMD system is
exclusively for Japan's protection, and will not be used in the event of disputes
between the PRC and Taiwan (Mochizuki, 2001). The "defensive nature" of
BMD is well-suited to Japan and is less liable to incite an arms race with China
(Arase, 2001, p. 6).
Implications of Taiwan on Sino-Japanese Relations
Since 1996, missiles have been deployed from China toward Taiwan's
southeast coastline. Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian estimates over 700 such
tests have been carried out, with almost 100 being conducted annually in recent
years (Reilly, 2005) Amphibious military drills by the Chinese have also
occurred in the region, fueling speculation that an invasion of Taiwan by the
Chinese is imminent (Reilly, 2005). This October 2005 marks the 60 th anniversary
of Taiwan's return to China after being held by Japan for 50 years. In an unusual
move, Beijing held massive celebrations marking this anniversary. However the
festivities and parades masked a covert message to Taiwan from the mainland:
Taiwan is an inalienable part of the PRe. This message echoed the sentiment
expressed in the passing of the Anti-secession Law in March 2005 (Ahmed, 2005).
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This legislation pre-approved non-peaceful measures to be taken if Taiwan
formally moved towards independence. Although the anniversary celebrations
were directed towards Taiwan, the traces of anti-Japanese sentiment in mainland
China associated with the events leading up to the return of the country in 1945
were evident (Ahmed, 2005).
During the past decades, Japan maintained a vague policy about its actions
in the event of Taiwan taking further steps towards independence. At the time of
normalization, Japan formally recognized Beijing as the only government; since
then any relations with the Taiwanese government have been through unofficial
intermediaries (Kawashima, 2003). Japan's close relationship with the United
States indirectly implicates it with the United State's actions in regard to Taiwan.
Beijing is all-too aware of the role Japan would play if the United States were to
physically support a move by Taiwan toward full independence.
Status of Japanese ODA to China
Japan's financial aid to China in the form of Official Development
Assistance (ODA) is another recent area of conflict. When relations between the
two nations were normalized in 1972, China decided to forego any demands for
reparations from Japan in lieu of receiving economic assistance (Wang, 1993).
Since 1972, Japan has been China's largest supplier ofODA in the form oflowinterest loans, grants, etc. Japan's total aid to China exceeds 33 billion dollars
("Japan minister," 2005).
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The recent concerns Japan has voiced to China concerning ODA deal with
three major issues. First, the very existence of ODA originating in Japan is rarely
publicized in China. Consequently, the majority of the people are not aware of
their neighbor nation's contribution, and are therefore deemed ungrateful by the
Japanese ("Japan minister," 2005). Another note of discord pertains to China's
own ODA contributions to other countries. Japan reasons that if China can offer
assistance to other nations, current aid into China is unnecessary ("It's time to
end," 2004). Last, Japan has expressed disapproval of China's recent ballooning
military and defense expenditures, as well as the general opacity of China's
budgets. Although China's military budget is cited as only 20% of that of the
United States', Japanese public opinion is suspicious of the recent increases and
questions its own financial contributions China (Mazzetti, 2005). Japanese
Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura announced in March 2005 that ODA to
China in the form of low-interest rate yen loans would cease in 2008 ("Japan
minister," 2005).
Controversial Interpretations of History
Several other current issues of debate between the two countries also have
roots in early and mid-twentieth century history. The horrendous acts of violence
committed by Japanese troops on the Chinese in the 1940s is frequently recapped
by Beijing in modem Sino-Japanese discourse. These wounds have not been
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opened by China indiscriminately though. Several episodes initiated by Japan
have served as catalysts for reopening heated discussion of the past.
Yasukuni Shrine Debate
The October 2005 visit to the Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo marked the fifth
time that Prime Minister Koizumi has made the trip to the memorial which honors
Japan's 2.5 million war casualties as well as 14 class-A war criminals (Yuan,
2005). Especially controversial is the Yasukuni museum's stance on the massacre
at Nanjing. "Residents were once again able to live their lives in peace." the
exhibit says of the effects of Japanese actions in the region (Onishi, 2005, p. A4).
To the chagrin of Asian neighbors, most notably China and South Korea,
Koizumi's repeated formal visits to Yasukuni in the capacity of the nation's
leader, serve as pep rallies for the growing nationalistic sentiments in Japan. As
issues of controversy between Japan and China become more numerous and wellpublicized, peoples' ways of viewing themselves and the opposing country are
gaining teeth.
Nationalist Japanese Textbooks Controversy
In addition to the prime minister's visits to Yasukuni, other events related

to Japan's militaristic past have been constant stumbling blocks in relations
between Japan and China during the past few years. For example, after junior
high and high school textbooks produced by the Japanese Society for History
Textbook Reform were approved for use by the Japanese education ministry in
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April 2005, China and South Korea both protested loudly. They claim that the
books, controversial within Japan as well, were overly nationalistic, ignoring
Japan's militaristic past and wrongs against its Asian neighbors. Critics lament
the textbook's dearth of entries dealing with subjects such as wartime sex slavery
and the Nanjing massacre ("China says," 2005).
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao claim that adoption of
these books by Japanese school systems will, "inevitably mislead and poison
teenagers"("China says," 2005). Following the endorsement of the books by the
Japanese government in April, large protests were staged in China, ending with the
vandalizing of Japanese-owned businesses in China. Protestors also threw rocks
and debris at the Japanese embassy; the Chinese police on hand made no attempt
to stop the destructive demonstrations. Although the Chinese government
eventually banned such protests, the dawdling pace of Beijing's reaction was
heavily criticized by Tokyo (Jennings, 2005). "Strong responses from the Asian
people should make the Japanese government renect deeply and profoundly,"
Chinese Premier Wen instead said in the days immediately following the protests
("Wen Seeking," 2005).
Japan's U.N. Security Council Bid
Another point of dissension between the two nations is Japan's thwarted
bid for a permanent U.N. Security Council seat. Leading the opposition to this
bid, China, a permanent member of the council, played the history card,
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passionately reviving memories of Japan's aggression throughout Asia in the midtwentieth century ("Wen Seeking," 2005). Only three Asian nations, Afghanistan,
Bhutan, and Maldives, supported Japan's bid. As a result, Japan has seemingly
lost any chance of obtaining the seat, and public opinion of the U.N. and China
within Japan has plummeted. In October Japan's ambassador to the U.N., Toshiro
Ozawa, issued a statement in regard to Japan's mounting frustration with the
international organization, "Japan is obligated to pay an assessed contribution that
far exceeds the sum of the contributions made by four out of the five permanent
members of the Security Council"(Kakuchi, 2005). Former head of the United
Nations University in Tokyo, Professor Takeshi Inoguchi, predicts that as Japan
prepares its budget for the coming years, the dues paid to the United Nations will
be reduced by as much as ten percent. Japanese frustration with the United
Nations appears to be rooted in deep resentment of China's role in sabotaging the
security seat bid.
East China Sea Oil Conflict
Another major area of international discrepancy lies at the bottom of the
East China Sea. Rich oil and gas deposits have been claimed by both Japan and
China. According to Japan, the deposits overlap the exclusive economic zones
(EEZs) of both countries. However, China recognizes different EEZ borders, and
thus argues that the area is neutral. Therefore the Chinese deem it open to
exploitation, and are currently drilling in the disputed area. ("Oil and Gas," 2005).
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While several rounds of talks have been held, no progress has been made.
Sentiments have been agitated by the staunch military presence China has
dispatched to monitor the area. In late October, another round of talks was
cancelled by China in response to Koizumi's most recent shrine visit.
It seems that the conflict over the natural gas and oil fields comes down to

pride on the parts of both nations. Although the "supposed 7 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas and close to 100 billion barrels of oil" (Hall, 2005, p. 58) is an
attractive lure, transportation of the resources back to Japan is difficult, and
interested companies might be hard to come by, especially if there is a significant
risk of damaging international relations.
Conclusions
With so many potential catalysts hovering in the horizon of Sino-Japanese
international relations, is it just a matter of time before these wars of words
escalate into serious military or economic conflict? China must contend with the
daunting military alliance between Japan and the United States; any action against
Japan would provoke an undesirable response from across the Pacific. Japan must
also weigh its options carefully, are both the government and people prepared to
finally stand up against China'?
China has recently surpassed the United States as Japan's largest trading
partner. While the entrenched economic interdependency of the two nations will
likely prevent complete breakdown of relations or perhaps even war, the inability

Sino-Japanese Relations 20
of either side to commit completely to the resolution of the disagreements
discussed in this paper is detrimental to the entire region's growth.
As a Japanese-American descendent of American WWII internees, I am
especially interested in Japan's reaction to the region's demands for reparation.
While it may be too late for Japan to follow Germany's footsteps of steep tinancial
compensation, I believe that for the sake of regional concord, Japan should thicken
its verbal apologies into something tangible to satiate the anti-Japanese dogma of
China. Only after this issue is settled will the playing table be evened and
negotiations made possible without the ominous history card resurfacing again.
I believe that Japan has been reluctant to make such reparations due to the
general lack of guilt felt by the population. Many Japanese see themselves as
victims of WWII, reinforcing that claim with memories of the victims of Nagasaki
and Hiroshima. The youth especially, often misinfonned as to the imperialist past
of Japan, see reparations as unnecessary and detrimental to the nationalistic trends
of modern Japan. Japanese point to the massive ODA contributions and maintain
that enough has already been done to help the Chinese. Popular Japanese
sentiment is that any further apologies or financial amends will only weaken Japan
in the eyes of its Asian neighbors. In my opinion, Japan should swallow its pride,
and strive to summon a tinal, all-encompassing. and perhaps financially backed,
admission of guilt, thereby eliminating the roadblock to Asian cooperation.
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Perhaps after this conciliatory move by Japan, China will dilute its opaque fa<;ade
and work for a close, mutually-beneficial relationship with its neighbor .

•
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